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DOLLAR-DENOMINATED ACCOUNTS IN LATIN 
AMERICA DURING THE 1990s 
By Pere Gomis-Porqueras, Carlos Serrano, and Alejandro Somuano* 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the evolution of dollar-denominated accounts in Latin America and 
how they impact the stability of the banking system and the volatility o f  macroeconomic 
aggregates. Our findings reveal that dollar deposits are strongly influenced by depreciation 
expectations ofthe local currency even in an environment of fairly low inflation. We also find that 
having more dollar accounts increases the probability of future crises if the economy is already in 
a crisis. Finally, our findings suggest hat for some macroeconomic aggregates there exists a 
positive correlation, in the long and short run, between their volatility and the volume of  dollar- 
denominated accounts in the banking system. (JEL E31, E44) 
The Dollar in Latin America 
During the past three decades, the dollar has increased its presence in most Latin American 
countries. The process began in the early 1970s, fueled by financial reforms. As capital and 
foreign exchange controls were lifted, the U.S. dollar began to gradually replace local currencies 
in the domestic itizens' portfolio. In several countries the observed pattern has been as follows. 
The dollar has first been used as a store of  value as residents maintained increasing portions of  
their wealth in dollar-denominated assets in order to avoid possible losses caused by 
macroeconomic instabilities. The dollar has then been used as a unit o f  account, mainly in the real 
estate sector, where prices have increasingly been quoted in dollars as a way to differentiate 
between changes in relative prices and changes in overall inflation. And finally the dollar has been 
used as medium of exchange.1 
In some countries, like Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, dollar-denominated accounts have not 
been used extensively. In others, such as Bolivia and Uruguay, dollar-denominated deposits have 
been a very important component of  monetary aggregates. Finally, Panama and, more recently, 
Ecuador have adopted the dollar as legal tender, replacing completely the domestic urrency. 
While there is a good theoretical understanding o f the implications of  having two monies, the 
empirical consequences are still an open issue. 2 It is commonly believed that allowing foreign 
currency deposits to coexist with domestic-denominated accounts may provide the opportunity for 
greater domestic intermediation, promote financial sophistication by increasing the number of  
* Pere Gomis-Porqueras, Department of Economics, University of Miami, Coral Gables FI 33124-6550, 
gomis@miami.edu; Carlos Serrano, Sociedad Hipoetcaria Federal de Mexico,Av. Ejereito Nacional 180, Col. Anzeres C.P. 
11590 Mexico D.F., asomuano@shf.gob.mx; Alejandro Somuano, Sociedad Hipoetcaria Federal de Mexico, Av. Ejercito 
Nacional 180, Col. Anzeres C.P. 11590 Mexico D.F., cserrano@shf.gob.mx. The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect he views of the Sociedad Hipoetcaria Federal de Mexico. The authors would like to thank Bruce Smith, 
Scott Freeman, Alex Minicozzi, Li Gan, Subal Kumbhakar, Gil Mehrez, Mafia Soledad Martinez-Peria, Keisuke Hirano, 
the participants ofthe University of Mississippi, Barcelona, nd Texas at Austin seminar series and an anonymous referee 
for useful comments. The authors would like to dedicate his paper to the memory of Bruce Smith. 
I For an excellent overview see Savastano (1992). 
2 Chang (1994) explores the relationship between currency substitution and inflationary finance in an overlapping 
generations model in which currency substitution is an endogenous equilibrium outcome. Chang (1994) shows that 
currency substitution may be a purely expectational phenomenon. Onthe other hand, Agenor and Khan (1996) investigate 
currency substitution i a dynamic, forward-looking model, where the actual currency holding is determined in a 
multiperiod cost-of-adjustment process. Similarly, Uribe (1997) employs a cash-in-advance model in which domestic 
currency is always in circulation and there is a reduction i the cost of using foreign currency as it is used in the economy. 
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available assets, and increase credibility by raising the cost of monetary indiscipline. Furthermore, 
the rapid development of foreign currency-denominated operations in the banking system may 
affect the stability of monetary aggregates, the dynamics of exchange rates, and government 
revenues from seigniorage. 3 In particular, the higher the elasticity of substitution between monies, 
the larger the shift from foreign to domestic currency-denominated accounts. Furthermore, 
allowing foreign currency-denominated d posits also reduces monetary independence, which may 
then endanger the ability of central bankers to implement stabilization programs. These types of 
accounts then magnify the possible fiscal problems ince seigniorage revenue is reduced. 4 Finally, 
allowing dollar-denominated accounts lessens the central bank's ability to act effectively as a 
lender of last resort, since it loses control over part of its monetary base. 
The empirical literature on currency substitution has primarily focused on the study of its main 
determinants. In general, several measures of macroeconomic nstability have been used as 
explanatory variables--proxies for the expected epreciation being the most commonly used--  
from reduced money demand equations that allow for holdings of foreign currency. Throughout 
the literature we find several case studies: Ortiz (1983) on Mexico; Ramirez-Rojas (1985) on 
Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay; Marquez (1987) on Venezuela; Rojas-Suarez (1991) on Peru; 
and Melvin and Afcha de la Parra (1989) on Bolivia. Some of these papers have found significant 
and positive signs on the coefficients for expected epreciation of the domestic urrency and 
inflation. 5 These results suggest hat depositors run away from local currencies whenever they 
expect losses associated with their domestic urrency. 6 
However, there have been some cases where we fmd an increase in dollar-denominated 
accounts while the country is following a successful macroeconomic stabilization program. 
Bolivia, for example, experienced an increase in dollarization after the macroeconomic 
stabilization program of 1985. In fact, Clements and Schwartz (1992) find that interest rate 
differentials and other measures for expected depreciation performed poorly when used as 
explanatory variables for the degree of dollarization during the 1986-1991 period. Other countries 
in the region have experienced similar episodes where the level of foreign currency-denominated 
deposits increased after a decrease in inflation and expected epreciation. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of dollar-denominated accounts in Latin 
America, how they impact the stability of the banking system, and the volatility of 
macroeconomic aggregates. Our fmdings reveal that dollar-denominated deposits are strongly 
influenced by depreciation expectations of the local currency even in an environment of fairly low 
inflation. We also show that having more dollar-denominated accounts increases the probability of 
future crises if the economy is already in a crisis. Finally, for some macroeconomic aggregates we 
fmd higher volatility, in the long and short run, when the volume of dollar-denominated accounts 
in the banking system increases. 
Measuring Account Substitution 
Following the tradition in the currency-substitution literature, we estimate two money demand 
equations for the two types of currency-denominated accounts. In order to take into account he 
increasing openness of Latin American economies during the 1990s, we consider two assets: 
foreign and domestic bonds. 7In particular, we consider the standard money demand equations (1) 
and (2) where m~i.t and rdr denote the demand for deposits by domestic residents in country i at 
3 A good iscussion ofseigniorage losses due to the adoption of a foreign currency isprovided inFischer (1982). 
4 See Vegh (1989) for a discussion on this important point. 
5 In these studies they consider the ratio of foreign currency deposits inthe financial system as a proxy for the degree 
ofdollarization in the economy. 
6 These findings are just lower-bound estimates since these studies cannot account for dollars circulating in the 
economy that are not intermediated hrough the banking system. 
7 As financial markets further develop, the number of available assets increases, affecting the agent's portfolio decision. 
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time t in local and foreign currency, respectively; Yu is the national income in country i at time t; 
lS.t is the domestic interest rate in country i at time t," and l~.t represents he interest rate paid on 
deposits in U.S dollars in country i at time t. 
log(m~,) = t0 + fll log(y,,,) + fl2IL + f131/ (1) 
log(mr) = 7'0 + V~ log(yu )+ Y2I~,at + Y3If  (2) 
Subtracting equation (1) from (2), we obtain expression (3). 
log(m f ) - log(mdt) = 30 + 3, log(yi., ) + t52Idt + 331 / (3) 
According to the uncovered interest parity condition, rates of return on identical debt 
instruments in two different countries, inclusive of the exchange rate, should be equal. Thus, this 
parity condition implies the relation (4) where et+ ~ is the exchange rate at time t+l. 
log(et+ 1) = log(e t ) + log(1 + I / )  - log(1 + l f )  (4) 
McCallum (1994), among others, finds that there are large deviations in the uncovered interest 
parity equation. Thus, if we want to study account substitution, we have to take this phenomenon 
into consideration. In this paper, we consider the following approximation: log(l+lS.t) - 
log(l+lri.)= Pi, t -I~,,t. Then the uncovered interest parity equation can be approximated by log(et+l)= 
log(e)+ I~.t -fi.t. If we now allow for country-specific deviations in the uncovered interest parity 
condition, we have that P,;t =F,-,+ log(et+l)- log(e)+e,.,. Thus, if we consider the approximation to
the uncovered interest parity equation and allow for country-specific frictions, we can derive the 
estimable quation (5) where R~.~ rd,.t/( mai, t+ rnri, t) is the ratio of foreign denominated accounts to 
total accounts. 
log(Ri, t) - log(Ri, t - 1) = a + 01 log(yi, t) + 021ai,, + 03 (log(e/, t + 1)- Iog(ei, t)) + e.i, t (5) 
As we can see, equation (5) suggests that the ratio of dollar-denominated accounts to total 
accounts can be partially explained by changes in the exchange rate, domestic income, and 
domestic interest rates. If the two demands for deposits, domestic and foreign, are identical, the 
coefficients in equation (5) should be statistically equal to zero. Therefore, any departure of the 
estimates from zero may capture any uncertainty and economic frictions faced by depositors when 
making their portfolio decisions. Some of these frictions may result from the fact that only certain 
transactions can be conducted with local currency and dollars, or there might be different 
minimum deposit requirements for or different deposit insurance on the two types of accounts. 
Data and Estimation Results 
The data for this study are drawn from several sources: the 1999 International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) published annually by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Levine, Loayza, 
and Beck (1998), Caprio and Klingebiel's (1999) data set; and several central banks. 
The countries included in the study are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Pica, Dominica, 
Ecuador, E1 Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Due to data 
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limitations, we concentrate on the 1990-1998 period. 8The resulting sample has 117 observations 
(13 countries, 9 years). 
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Country: 1990-1998. 
Country R (%) GDP log( et+l ) ]d 
et 
Argentina 41.74 4877.09 0.03 183.28 
(5.76) (1056.55) (0.088) (500.77) 
Belize 1.486 1785.73 -.0005 8.64 
(0.88) (152.50) (0.019) (0.47) 
Bolivia 67.97 606.22 -0.476 19.66 
(8.03) (92.61) (0.062) (3.98) 
Costa Rica 30.38 1661.45 0.051 18.42 
(4.53) (266.75) (0.04) (4.85) 
Dominica 1.81 213.81 -0.0006 4.07 
(0.96) (30.17) (0.019) (0.13) 
Ecuador 13.12 868.18 0.111 38.86 
(01.23) (165.16) (0.057) (6.22) 
El Salvador 5.03 1017.64 0.004 13.87 
(1.78) (296.61) (0.025) (2.42) 
Honduras 13.21 490.85 0.104 13.80 
(9.49) ( 155.86) (0.142) (4.08) 
Mexico 13.77 2495.70 0.065 19.83 
(3.43) (494.86) (0.101) (8.59) 
Nicaragua 47.18 307.00 0.15 11.45 
(14.94) (43.33) (0.283) (0.90) 
Paraguay 32.33 1092.07 0.044 19.78 
(7.49) (150.84) (0.023) (3.59) 
Peru 54.57 1353.25 0.098 310.77 
(6.83) (465.58) (0.099) (799.86) 
Uruguay 77.62 3041.46 0.103 44.99 
(2.81) (1039.13) (0.051) (26.83) 
Standard Deviations are presented in parentheses. 
The variables used in the estimation of equation (5) are calculated as follows. The ratio of 
foreign-denominated currency deposits (FCD) to domestic-denominated currency deposits 
measured at the end of the period is obtained from the IFS, some central banks, and the IMF 
Western Hemisphere Department. 9 The nominal GDP per capita is computed by dividing the 
nominal value of GDP by the total population and then multiplying it by the end-of-period 
exchange rate. l~ The interest rates employed in this study are the deposit rates reported by the IFS. 
The corresponding summary statistics for our sample are presented in Table 1. 
8 Although information  most monetary and maeroeconomic variables i  available since 1970 for all countries, we 
could only obtain data on foreign currency deposits for a subset of Latin American countries and just for the 1990s. 
9 FCD include all dollar-denominated bank accounts both from domestic and foreign banks. 
l0 These variables were obtained from the IFS. 
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Although each country shows important peculiarities, some stylized facts can be drawn. The 
first observation is that the dollarization ratio, which is the ratio of FCD to total deposits, has been 
steadily increasing over time for the majority of countries in our sample. In particular, while in 
1990 the average ratio for these countries was 0.23, in 1998 it rose to 0.37. A second interesting 
fact is that this increase comes in a period when the inflation rate has dramatically decreased. In 
1990 the average inflation rate for the 13 countries was 1,353 percent (315 percent without 
counting the hyperinflation episodes of Argentina, Nicaragua, and Peru). On the other hand, it was 
10 percent in 1998. As we can see, the increasing volume of dollar-denominated accounts in the 
banking system can significantly reduce the ability of central banks to act as a lender of last resort 
and to conduct monetary policy. 
Table 2: Account Substitution: 1990-1998. 
Specification Variable Estimates t-star 
Fixed Effects 
Random Effects 
log(y) -0.02 -0.12 
I d 0.258 1.213 
log(et+l/et) -0.588* -1.78 
constant  -2.054 - 1.175 
log(y) -0.026 -0.209 
I d 0.282* 1.423 
log(et+t/et) -0.597** -1.833 
Notes: Adjusted R2 = 0.948 (Fixed Effects); Adjusted R2 = 0.897 (Random Effects); 
Hausman specification test for Ho: FE vs RE: •2(3) = 0.72. *(**) represents 10 
percent (5 percent) significance level. 
Due to the nature of our data, the best approach to analyze account substitution is through 
panel data estimation. A priori, it is not clear that differences in account substitution in different 
countries can be viewed as parametric shifts since we only have data on a subset of Latin 
American countries. Thus, a fixed and random effect treatment is warranted. The results 
corresponding to the account substitution are presented in Table 2. The coefficient of expected 
appreciation of the local currency is negative and significant, corroborating previous ffmdings in 
the literature ven in an environment where inflation has been greatly reduced. The data suggest 
that account substitution in Latin America strongly depends on the expected relative returns 
between currencies, emphasizing the role of future expectations. The significance of the expected 
relative returns between currencies in explaining account substitution is observed both in the f'txed 
and random effect models. Typically, with small samples uch as ours, the magnitude, sign, and 
significance of the estimates vary widely from one specification to the next. However, our 
findings yield similar estimates and significance levels for both specifications, highlighting the 
importance of the expected relative returns between currencies. Finally, we also perform a 
Hausman specification test, which suggests that restrictions on the intercept of the random-effects 
model are not observed in the data. There is no justification for treating the individual effects as 
uncorrelated to the regressors as is assumed in the random effects model. I f  this is the case, the 
random effects treatment may then suffer from the inconsistency of omitted variables. See Table 2 
for specific estimates and specification tests. 
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As we can see, our specification is able to partially explain the relative movements between 
dollar- and domestic-denominated accounts in Latin America in the 1990s. Such movements are 
mainly explained by appreciation expectations of the domestic urrency even in a moderately ow- 
inflation environment. These findings then demonstrate hat depositors in Latin America face 
some uncertainty and economic frictions when making their portfolio decisions since our 
estimates are statistically different from zero. 
Dollar Accounts and Banking Crisis 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of Latin American countries experienced severe 
banking crises. Some of these banking crises also had associated currency crises. A variety of 
theoretical models try to explain the link between currency and banking crises, One chain of 
causation runs from balance-of payment problems to banking crises. For example, Mishkin (1996) 
argues that, if a devaluation occurs, the position of banks could be weakened further if a large 
share of their liabilities is denominated in foreign currency. On the other hand, models such as 
Velasco (1987) point to the opposite causal direction. Financial sector problems give rise to 
currency collapses. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) provide evidence that, most often, the chain of 
causality runs from banking crises to currency crises rather than in the other direction. 
As we can see, the effect hat foreign currency deposits may have on the banking system is 
ambiguous. A high level of dollar deposits in an economy in which the dollar is used as a store of 
value but not as a medium of exchange will result in higher exchange rate risk in the banks' 
balance sheets. Banks that take deposits in dollars do not typically lend in domestic urrency, 
since they are restricted to maintain small foreign exchange positions by regulation. The problem 
arises when there is lending in dollars to corporations and individuals that do not have dollar 
revenues. On the other hand, allowing domestic- and foreign-currency denominated deposits can 
help prevent capital outflows by increasing the ability of the banking system to better absorb 
adverse shocks. In this section we explore the relationship between dollar-denominated accounts 
and the stability of the banking system while explicitly taking into account currency crises. 
As preliminary evidence, we investigate how the probability of a banking crisis is influenced 
by the degree of dollarization in the economy. Using the Caprio et al. (1999) database, which 
reports banking crises for a large set of countries, we calculate the probability of a banking crisis 
given a certain degree of dollarization. H We fred that the probability of a banking crisis increases 
with the degree of dollarization by threefold. In particular, the probability of a banking crisis given 
that the economy is highly dollarized is 0.381. On the other hand, if the economy is not highly 
dollarized, the probability of a banking crisis is 0.130. Thus, the data suggest hat dollar- 
denominated accounts may bring instability to the banking system. 
We then investigate the relationship between the severity of banking crises and the degree of 
dollarization. 12The probability of a severe banking crisis increases with the degree of dollarization 
also by threefold. In particular, the probability of a severe banking crisis given that the economy is 
highly dollarized is 0.302. On the other hand, if the economy is not highly dollarized, the 
probability of a severe banking crisis is 0.130. 
As we can see, having dollar-denominated accounts not only increases the frequency of 
banking crises but also their severity. These findings emphasize the potential shortcomings of not 
placing adequate r strictions on foreign-denominated accounts in the banking system. 
In order to present stronger evidence, it is necessary to introduce some additional controls. 
Following Demirgiiq-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), we consider amultivariate logit specification. 
11 Following Balino, Bennett, and Borensztein (1997), when the average dollarization ratio is above 30 percent for the 
period 1990 to 199g, the economy is classified as highly dollarized. 
12 Caprio et al. (1999) classify banking crises into two major groups: ystemic banking crises, where most or all of 
banking system capital is eroded, and mild banking crises. 
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This approach can identify a number of interesting correlations. However, since we are estimating 
reduced forms, such correlations should be interpreted with caution because they do not specify 
the direction of causality. 13 
Within a macroeconomic framework, previous work on banking crises has not systematically 
addressed the issue of persistence. Some authors ignore the issue altogether, others consider 
observations up to the first crisis, and fmally some studies introduce the length of the crisis as an 
indicator of persistence. We propose a two-stage Markov process allowing for the possibility that 
previous outcomes may affect future crises. 14 In particular, we consider the following conditional 
probability where P(Y~.,IY~,,q) is the probability that a banking crisis takes place given what 
happened in the previous period, F is the logistic distribution function, X,., is the set of explanatory 
variables, and fl and a are the parameters tobe estimated. 
P(Yi,t I Yi,t-t) = F (X ia~ + Xi,tYi,t-l~ 
This conditional probability can be interpreted in terms of the following Markov transition 
probabilities. 
Po, = F(Xi , , f l )  
PH = F (X i , t f l  + Xi,tYi,t-1 a) 
The Markov transition probabilities that we consider in this paper examine the interaction 
between the degree of dollarization and past banking crises. Unfortunately, due to data limitations 
we can only consider a subset of controls used in the literature of banking crises. We consider a
constant, per capita GDP, the real interest rate (1NT), the exchange rate (E), domestic urrency 
devaluation dummies (DUM), and the ratio of dollar denominated accounts to total deposits (R). 
The estimates obtained from the different specifications show that banking crises are strongly 
persistent over time since past banking crises are always positive and significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level. The estimates of past banking crises, while taking into account the current 
degree of dollarization, are the largest among all other controls. This finding then suggests that once 
in a crisis we are more likely to observe a banking crisis in the future when the economy is 
substantially dollarized. We also fred standard results in the literature. An increase in the domestic 
interest rate and the exchange rate augment the probability of banking crises. With higher interest 
rates the opportunity cost of holding reserves i greater, so banks tend to reduce them, increasing the 
chances of banking failures. Furthermore, the data also suggest a small and negative ffect of GDP 
on the probability of experiencing banking crises. Thus, a healthier economy is less likely to 
experience banking crises. These findings then may reflect he possibility that an increased exchange 
rate exposure of dollar accounts in an already weak banking system is likely to augment he 
probability of banking crises. The different estimates are presented in Table 3. 
As we can see, these correlations suggest agradual process when deregulating the banking 
system because of the potential negative ffects of dollar accounts in weaker economies. In
particular, before foreign currency deposits are allowed, the banking system should have as many 
resources as possible in order to minimize the increased exchange rate exposure from these dollar 
accounts. Thus, some sort of adequate capital requirements should be in place before these types 
of accounts are allowed, possibly reducing future chances of bank failures. 
13 In this paper we do not perform a Granger causality test because this test strongly depends on having the appropriate 
conditioning information set. Unfortunately, due to data limitations we are not able to control for all known factors that 
help explain banking crises. 
14 See Amemiya (1997) for a complete discussion  Markov processes. 
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Table 3: Banking Crisis: 1990-1998. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant  - 1.482" * - 1.636 ** -2.666* 
(-3.1) (-2.88) (-2.45) 
R 0.281 0.363 2.343 
(0.25) (0.28) (0.30) 
R,Y,_I 4.4** 4.066** 4.546** 
(4.02) (3.53) (3.02) 
DUM 0.438 0.429 0.203 
(1.23) (1.12) (0.53) 
E 1.28E-03 7.88E-03" 1.22E-02"* 
(0.92) (1.54) (3.43) 
GDP -1.48E-07 -2.45E-07"* 
(-1.22) (-2.45) 
INT 3.09E-03"* 
(1.8) 
p 0.334 0.447 0.8 
X 2 4.37 6.16 12.65 
t-statistics are in parentheses. *(**) represents 10percent (5percent) significance l vel 
Dollar Accounts and Volatility 
According to Friedman (1960, p. 23), "the central problem [of monetary policy] is not to 
construct ahighly sensitive instrument that can continuously offset instability introduced by other 
factors, but rather to prevent monetary arrangements from themselves becoming aprimary source 
of instability." Friedman's observation is even more relevant when the monetary authority allows 
other currencies to coexist in the banking system. 
Previous literature on currency substitution has not provided much empirical evidence linking 
the degree of dollarization and volatility. The studies that have addressed this issue focus on 
money demand and money multipliers. Balifio et al. (1997) argue that money demand appears to 
be more volatile in highly dollarized economies since the coefficient of variation on the velocity of 
money is markedly higher than that of moderately dollarized economies. The authors fmd mixed 
evidence with respect to the volatility of the money multiplier. 
Table 4: Long-Run Correlations between 
Dollarization and Volatility Measures. 
Correlation 
GDP 0.322 
INT  0.373 
E 0.327 
INF  0.350 
BM 0A30 
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In this paper we attempt to provide additional evidence linking volatility and dollar- 
denominated accounts. Our measure for long-run volatility is defined as the coefficient of 
variation so cross-country comparisons can be made. As preliminary evidence, we explore the 
long-run effects of dollar-denominated accounts on volatility across countries. In particular, we 
compute the correlations between the degree of dollarization (R) and broad money (BM), the 
exchange rate (E), per capita GDP, real interest rates (INT), and the inflation rate (INF). Our 
results confirm that volatility increases as the degree of dollarization in the economy rises. 
Furthermore, the correlations range from 0.43 for broad money to 0.31 for per capita GDP. The 
correlations corresponding to several macroeconomic variables are reported in Table 4. 
Unfortunately, our sample is very small. We just have 13 long-run observations (one for each 
country); therefore, we do not have a robust statistic to test our null hypothesis on the previous 
correlations. In order to avoid this small sample problem, we perform several bootstraps. We 
randomly choose 13 pairs from our original data set and compute the corresponding correlation, 
repeating the process a thousand timesJ 5 We then obtain an empirical distribution of the resulting 
correlations. We can then use it to test the null hypothesis that higher dollarization is associated 
with higher volatility in the long run. Our long-run results reveal that two macroeconomic 
variables, real interest and inflation rates, have a statistically positive correlation with the degree 
of dollarization at the 10 percent level. 16 The characteristics of the empirical distributions 
corresponding to the bootstrap correlations are presented in Table 5. These findings suggest that 
economies that are more dollarized tend to experience higher volatility in the real interest and 
inflation rates. 17 
Table 5: Empirical Distribution of the Bootstrapped Correlations. 
Variable Max Min Stdev Kurtosis Skewness Mean 
GDP 0.931 -0.833 0.308 0.524 -0.702 0.291 
0.962 -0.646 0.193 1.618 -0.221 0.404"* 
INT 
0.965 -0.855 0.301 0.425 -0.597 0.304 
E 
0.965 -0.751 0.229 1.289 -0.059 0.356* 
INF 
BM 0.944 -0.705 0.232 0.787 -0.73 0.42 
* ( ** ) represents 10percent (5percent) significance level. 
In order to provide further evidence, we consider the short-run relationships between volatility 
and dollar accounts. In particular, we propose a panel that controls for other factors that might 
affect volatility, as suggested by the expression (6) where X~.t is the logarithm of the variable under 
study, Ai is its corresponding sample average, is the percentage of dollar-denominated accounts to 
15 The pairs consisted ofthe degree of dollarization a d the measure ofvolatility for each macroeconomic variable 
under study. 
16 Since the inflation rate was computed using the CPI and most of the goods in the basket are purchased using local 
currency, the volatility of the price level may be accentuated. 
17 Our test does not indicate the direction of causality. 
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total deposits, and Z~., are other factors that might affect the volatility of  Xi.,. The controls we use 
are the inflation rate (1NF) and the exchange rate (E). ~8 
VXi, , - (X i , t  - h i )  2 = a i q- fllRi,t + fl2Zi,t +F.i,t (6) 
Due to the nature of  our data, we analyze the relationship between volatility and doUarization 
using panel data estimation techniques. A priorL it is not clear that differences in volatility in the 
different countries can be viewed as parametric shifts since we only have data on a subset of  Latin 
American countries. Our results show that the short-run volatility of GDP and the exchange rate are 
positively related to dollar-denominated deposits when ftxed effects are considered. We tend to 
observe higher volatility in GDP than in the exchange rate. When random effects are considered, we 
find a positive correlation between the degree of  dollarization and the short-run volatility in GDP, the 
exchange rate, domestic inflation, and domestic interest rates. Furthermore, we tend to find higher 
volatility in the inflation rate than in the exchange rate and per capita GDP. Finally, we also perform 
a Hausman specification test, suggesting that restrictions on the intercept of the random-effects 
model are not observed in the data. 
Table 6: Short Run Volatility: 1990-1998. 
Specification VGo e Ve Vmv Vld 
Fixed Effects 
Random Effects 
R 1.201"* 0.879** 0.803 0.198 
(2.115) (1.873) (1.141) (1.236) 
1NF 0.001"* 0.001"* 0.643E-03"* -0.1E-5** 
(2.605) (3.327) (2.568) (-5.003) 
E 0.001 0.001 -0.004* 0.001"* 
(0.536) (0.567) (-1.449) (1.985) 
R 2 0.907 0.903 0.817 0.917 
Adj. R 2 0.905 0.889 0.790 0.905 
C 18.578"* -0.249 4.087** 13.743"* 
(2.5) (-0.273) (4.726) (27.673) 
R 1.073"* 0.684* 1.1"* 0.206* 
(1.989) (1.579) (2.040) (1.367) 
1NF 0.001"* 0.001"* 0.001"* 0"* 
(2.474) (2.988) (3.140) (-5.089) 
E 0.003 0.003** -0.004* 0.001"* 
(1.080) (1.696) (-1.361) (2.107) 
R 2 0.907 0.875 0.746 0.909 
Adj. R 2 0.905 0.871 0.740 0.907 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. *(**) represents 10 percent (5 percent) significance l vel. 
Hausman specification test for Ho: FE vs RE: X2(3) = 0.72. 
18 High inflation erodes the value of income and savings and leads to high nominal interest rates. It also implies 
considerable inflation volatility and overall volatility because it increases the uncertainty about future relative prices and 
the price level. Finally, it has been observed that the type of exchange r gime followed by the monetary authority can 
induce volatility in the overall economy. 
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As we can see from Table 6, there is some evidence, in the long and short run, that there is a 
positive correlation for some macroeconomic aggregates between their volatility and the volume 
of dollar-denominated accounts. Allowing another currency in the banking system seems to be 
associated with an increase in the volatility of the economy. Thus, any stabilization plan aimed at 
controlling economic fluctuations hould take into account the existence of dollar-denominated 
accounts ince they may directly affect he overall volatility in the economy. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we study how agents in Latin America allocate part of their savings between 
dollar- and domestic urrency-denominated accounts. In particular, we show that the relative 
movements between these accounts are explained by devaluation expectations of the local 
currency. Our findings suggest hat depositors in Latin America face some uncertainty and 
economic frictions when making their portfolio decisions. 
We also explore some macroeconomic consequences ofhaving dollar accounts in the banking 
system. In particular, we fmd that past banking crises and the current degree of dollarization are 
good predictors of future crises. In particular, once the crisis has occurred, having more dollar- 
denominated deposits in the banking system increases the probability of a crisis in the future. This 
may reflect he increased exchange rate exposure associated with dollar accounts in an already 
weak banking system. 
Finally, we present some evidence, in the long and short run, that here is a positive correlation 
for some macroeconomic aggregates between their volatility and the volume of dollar- 
denominated accounts. Thus, any stabilization plan aimed at controlling economic fluctuations 
should take into account he existence of dollar-denominated accounts ince they may directly 
affect he overall volatility in the economy. 
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